

Office of the Inspector General City Colleges of Chicago



Office of the Inspector General Bi-Annual Report January 1, 2021 – June 30, 2021

Prepared pursuant to Article II, Section 2.7.5 of the Board Bylaws

Lamesha Smith Inspector General

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To: Juan Salgado, Chancellor

Dr. Walter E. Massey, Chair of the Board of Trustees

Elizabeth Swanson, Vice-Chairperson of the Board of Trustees

Peggy A. Davis, Secretary of the Board of Trustees

Karen Kent, Trustee Laritza Lopez, Trustee

Deborah H. Telman, Trustee Darrell A. Williams, Trustee

Imran Fazal Hoque, Student Trustee

From: Lamesha Smith, Inspector General

Date: August 18, 2021

RE: Office of the Inspector General Bi-Annual Report for the period of January 1,

2021 through June 30, 2021

This *Bi-Annual Report* is being provided to the Chancellor and the Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 pursuant to Article 2.7.5 of the Board Bylaws. This *Bi-Annual Report* covers the period of January 1, 2021 through June 30, 2021. Pursuant to Article 2.7.5, the *Bi-Annual Report* for the period of January 1st through June 30th is required no later than September 1st each year.

Article 2.7 et seq. of the Board Bylaws authorizes the OIG for the City Colleges of Chicago to conduct investigations regarding waste, fraud and misconduct by any officer, employee, or member of the Board; any contractor, subcontractor, consultant or agent providing or seeking to provide goods or services to the City Colleges of Chicago; and any program administered or funded by the District or Colleges.

The OIG thanks the Chancellor, the Board of Trustees and the administration of the City Colleges of Chicago for their cooperation and support.

Office of the Inspector General Bi-Annual Report

Mission of the Office of the Inspector General

The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") of the City Colleges of Chicago ("CCC") will help fuel CCC's drive towards increased student success by promoting economy, efficiency, effectiveness and integrity in the administration of the programs and operations of CCC by conducting fair, independent, accurate, and thorough investigations into allegations of waste, fraud and misconduct, as well as by reviewing CCC programs and operations and recommending policies and methods for the elimination of inefficiencies and waste and for the prevention of misconduct.

The OIG should be considered a success when students, faculty, staff, administrators and the public:

- perceive the OIG as a place where they can submit their complaints/concerns in a confidential and independent setting;
- trust that a fair, independent, accurate, and thorough investigation will be conducted and that the findings and recommendations made by the OIG are objective and consistent; and
- expect that the OIG's findings will be carefully considered by CCC administration and that the OIG's recommendations will be implemented when objectively appropriate.

New Developments

Assistant Inspector General

Effective April 26, 2021, Ana Collazo was hired to fill the position of Assistant Inspector General. Ana Collazo, an attorney, has significant professional experience regarding investigations, ethics, and inspector general-related work.

Updates to Federal Criminal Case

As discussed in the OIG Bi-Annual Report for the period of July 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019, on November 19, 2019, as a result of an investigation initiated by the OIG, and worked in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, a federal grand jury indicted three CCC employees (a former vice chancellor, a former project director, and a now former liaison with local government agencies) as well as five CCC vendors. The indictment totaled

¹ Copies of the press release from the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois

sixteen counts of wire fraud and two counts of making a false statement to the FBI.

The following update subsequently took place during this reporting period:

- Sharod Gordon, former vice chancellor, was originally charged with 16 counts of wire fraud. In June 2021, Sharod Gordon voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to Count 8 of the Indictment. In the Plea Declaration, Sharod Gordon indicated, in pertinent part, the following:
 - I, Sharod Gordon, a named defendant in this case, voluntarily enter a plea of guilty to Count 8 of the Indictment. I am pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of committing mail fraud and wire in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 1346.

The Plea Declaration was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on June 15, 2021. A sentencing date for Sharod Gordon is pending.

During the previous reporting period, Krystal Stokes, the former project director, entered into a Plea Agreement that was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 15, 2020. Krystal Stokes was originally charged with two counts of wire fraud and one count of making a false statement to the FBI. The Plea Agreement indicated, in pertinent part, the following:

Charge to Which Defendant is Pleading Guilty

By this Plea Agreement, defendant agrees to enter a voluntary plea of guilty to the following count of the indictment: Count 7, which charges defendant with wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343. . .

Cooperation

Defendant agrees she will fully and truthfully cooperate in any matter in which she is called upon to cooperate by a representative of the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois.

and the indictment can be accessed at the following link: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/federal-indictment-charges-former-vice-chancellor-city-colleges-chicago-devising.

This cooperation shall include providing complete and truthful information in any investigation and pre-trial preparation and complete and truthful testimony in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding. Defendant agrees to the postponement of her sentencing until after the conclusion of her cooperation.

As of the date of this Bi-Annual Report, the criminal charges against the other defendants charged in this case are still pending. In the previous *Bi-Annual Report*, for the reporting period of July 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020, the OIG detailed the dispositions regarding two of the other defendants. In August 2021, the OIG received partial restitution payments for those two defendants. The details are summarized as follows.

- Tiffany Capel, the principal of a CCC vendor, was originally charged with one count of wire fraud. In August 2020, Tiffany Capel entered into an Agreement to Defer Prosecution, which was approved by Judge Dow of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on August 17, 2020. Under the terms and conditions of the agreement, Tiffany Capel agreed not to violate any laws as well as to abide by various other terms and conditions, including paying \$15,000 in restitution to CCC.
 - o In August 2021, the OIG received a partial restitution payment in the amount of \$700.00 via check for Tiffany Capel. Subsequently, the OIG provided the aforementioned restitution check to the CCC Controller's Office for deposit into CCC's treasury.
- Marquita Payne, the principal of a CCC vendor, was originally charged with two counts of wire fraud. In December 2020, Marquita Payne entered into an Agreement to Defer Prosecution, which was approved by Judge Dow of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 21, 2020. Under the terms and conditions of the agreement, Marquita Payne agreed not to violate any laws as well as to abide by various other terms and conditions, including paying \$15,000 in restitution to CCC.
 - In August 2021, the OIG received a partial restitution payment in the amount of \$8,400.00 via check for Marquita Payne. Subsequently, the OIG provided the aforementioned restitution check to the CCC Controller's Office for deposit into CCC's treasury.

Updates to Investigations Documented in Previous Bi-Annual Reports

<u>Updates regarding recommendations made during the July 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020 reporting period</u>

In the *Bi-Annual Report* submitted for the July 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020 reporting period, the OIG submitted three reports documenting investigations, which resulted in sustained findings of waste, fraud and misconduct. The following table updates the actions recommended by the OIG as well as the actions taken by CCC as of the time of submission of this *Bi-Annual Report* related to the reports documented in the *Bi-Annual Report* submitted for the July 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020 reporting period.

Updates from Investigations Reported on in Previous Bi-Annual Report (July 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020)						
Case Number	Title	OIG Recommendation	Action Taken			
20-0207	Investigation of time and attendance / payroll issue at a City College	Human Resources- related policy recommendation	Awaiting response			
17-0179	Tiffany Capel ² / CCC vendor	Permanent Debarment	Permanent Debarment effective August 5, 2021			
19-0076	Full-Time Faculty	Termination / DNRH	Termination / DNRH			


Complaints Received

For the period of January 1, 2021 through June 30, 2021, the OIG received 55 complaints. These 55 complaints included complaints forwarded to the OIG from outside sources as well as investigations (or audits / reviews) initiated on the OIG's own initiative.³ The following table documents the complaints received by

² As summarized in the Bi-Annual Report for the period of July 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021, on November 19, 2019, as a result of an investigation initiated by the OIG and worked in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, a federal grand jury indicted three CCC employees and five vendors. Among the indicted vendors was Tiffany Capel, the principal of a CCC vendor who was indicted for one count of wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 1346. On August 14, 2020, Tiffany Capel signed an Agreement to Defer Prosecution with the United States Government, which was approved by Judge Dow of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on August 17, 2020. In her Agreement to Defer Prosecution, Tiffany Capel made various admissions which served as causes for debarment pursuant to the CCC Debarment Policy, as contained in Article 5.3 of the Board Policies and Procedures for Management and Government.

³ Under Article 2.7.2 of the Board Bylaws, the powers and duties of the OIG include: c) To

the OIG during the current and previous reporting periods.



The 55 complaints received represent a variety of subject matters. The following table documents the subject matters of the complaints received.

investigate and audit the conduct and performance of the District's officers, employees, members of the Board, agents, and contractors, and the District's functions and programs, either in response to a complaint or on the Inspector General's own initiative, in order to detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse within the programs and operations of the District....

Subject Matters of Complaints Received from January 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021				
Subject Matter (Allegation)	Number	Percentage		
Board Mandated Audit	1	1.82%		
Engaging in Work While Under the Influence of Alcohol	1	1.82%		
Hostile Work Environment	1	1.82%		
Theft	1	1.82%		
OIG Initiated Review	1	1.82%		
Violation of Responsible Computer Use Policy	1	1.82%		
Engaging in Conduct in Violation of the Illinois Compiled Statutes	1	1.82%		
Unknown	1	1.82%		
Inattention to Duty	1	1.82%		
Violation of Outside Employment Policy	2	3.64%		
Violation of CCC Ethics Policy	3	5.45%		
Giving Preferential Treatment	4	7.27%		
Unfair Treatment	5	9.09%		
Discourteous Treatment	6	10.91%		
Discrimination	6	10.91%		
Falsification of Attendance Records	6	10.91%		
Residency	6	10.91%		
Fraud (including suspicious emails and identity theft)	8	14.55%		
Total	55	100.00%		

Status of Complaints

As reported in the previous Bi-Annual Report, as of December 31, 2020, the OIG had 79 pending complaints, meaning that the OIG was in the process of conducting investigations regarding these complaints. During the period of January 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021, the OIG closed 67 complaints. The following chart categorizes the reasons that the OIG closed the 67 complaints during the current reporting period.

Complaints Closed Between January 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021				
Reason Closed		Percentage		
Completion of Board Mandated Audit	1	1.49%		
Sustained	0^{4}	0.00%		
Not Sustained but Report Submitted with Recommendations		1.49%		
Not Sustained / No Policy Violation		47.76%		
Referred / Deferred	17	25.37%		
Subject Inactive	11	16.42%		
Duplicate Complaint	5	7.46%		
Totals	67	100.00%		

⁴ As will be discussed later in this *Bi-Annual Report*, during the period of January 1, 2021 through June 30, 2021, the OIG issued three reports, and one of those reports was a sustained investigation regarding OIG Case Number 17-0179. However, OIG Case Number 17-0179 remains an active investigation while the remaining defendants' criminal cases are pending. As such, this table reflects zero closed cases that were sustained instead of one.

Regarding the complaints closed during the period of January 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021, the following table documents the average number of calendar days between the date that the complaints were received and the date that the complaints were closed, in comparison to the average number of calendar days that complaints were received and closed during the previous reporting period (July 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020).⁵

Average Calendar Days to Close					
	7/1/20 to 12/31/20		1/1/21 to 6/30/21		
Reason Closed	Number	Average Calendar Days to Close	Number	Average Calendar Days to Close	
Sustained	2	485	06	-	
Completion Board Mandated Audit	0	-	1	148	
Not Sustained but Report Submitted with Recommendations	0	-	1	206	
Not Sustained / No Policy Violation	29	250	32	300	
Referred / Deferred	18	1	17	0	
Subject Inactive	1	0	11	44	
Duplicate Complaint	11	2	5	1	
Complaint Included with An Active Investigation	1	1	0	-	
Administratively Closed	3	372	0	-	
Totals	65		67		

As of June 30, 2021, the OIG had 67 pending complaints. Twenty-three of these 67 pending complaints (34.3%) were received between January 1, 2021 and June 30, 2021, and 13 of these 67 pending complaints (19.4%) were received between July 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020.

OIG Reports Submitted – January 1, 2021 to June 30, 2021

During the reporting period of January 1, 2021 through June 30, 2021, the OIG submitted three reports.⁷ These three reports included the following: one report

⁵ A complaint is considered closed only after the investigative activity of the investigator to whom the complaint was assigned has been reviewed and approved by a Supervising Investigator or the Assistant Inspector General and the Inspector General. In situations where a complaint is sustained, the complaint is not considered closed until the Investigative Summary documenting the investigation is prepared and submitted pursuant to Article 2.7.3 of the Board Bylaws.

⁶ As will be discussed later in this *Bi-Annual Report*, during the period of January 1, 2021 through June 30, 2021, the OIG issued three reports, and one of those reports was a sustained investigation regarding OIG Case Number 17-0179. However, OIG Case Number 17-0179 remains an active investigation while the remaining defendants' criminal cases are pending. As such, this table reflects zero closed cases that were sustained instead of one.

⁷ Pursuant to Article 2.7.3 of the Board Bylaws, the Inspector General submits reports to the Chancellor, the Board Chairperson, and the General Counsel at the conclusion of an investigation with recommendations for disciplinary or other action.

documenting sustained findings of waste, fraud and/or misconduct; one report documenting not sustained findings of waste, fraud, and/or misconduct in which recommendations were made; and the report regarding the annual Board-mandated audit of the District's compliance with the CCC Residency Policy.

Report Submitted Documenting Sustained Findings of Waste, Fraud and/or Misconduct

OIG Case Number 17-0179

As noted earlier in this Bi-Annual Report, on November 19, 2019, as a result of an investigation initiated by the OIG, and worked in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, a federal grand jury indicted three CCC employees and five vendors, including Marquita Payne (aka Marquita Cunningham), the principal of a CCC vendor, who was indicted for two counts of wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 1346.8 On December 18, 2020, Marquita Payne signed an Agreement to Defer Prosecution with the United States Government, which was approved by Judge Dow of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 21, 2020.

In her Agreement to Defer Prosecution, Marquita Payne made various admissions, which serve as causes for debarment pursuant to the CCC Debarment Policy, as contained in Article 5.3 of the Board Policies and Procedures for Management and Government. These admissions included the following:

- Marquita Payne admitted that she was the sole proprietor of a CCC vendor.
- Marquita Payne admitted that she was involved in a romantic relationship with Sharod Gordon.
- Marquita Payne admitted that Sharod Gordon's duties included, among other things, soliciting quotes from potential vendors to provide services to CCC, reviewing invoices from vendors, considering bids for contracts with CCC, and approving invoices in certain circumstances.
- Marquita Payne admitted that as an employee of CCC, Sharod Gordon owed a duty of honest services to CCC.
- Marquita Payne admitted that policies and procedures in place at CCC prohibited employees of CCC from making, or participating in the making of any decision, or taking any action with respect to any matter in which the employee had any special interest, unless the special interest was

⁸ Copies of the press release from the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and the indictment can be accessed at the following link: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/federal-indictment-charges-former-vice-chancellor-city-colleges-chicago-devising.

properly disclosed.

- See Article 5.2.10(1) of the CCC Ethics Policy.
- Marquita Payne understood that CCC defined a special interest as including a romantic relationship.
 - o See Article 5.2.2(ee) of the CCC Ethics Policy.
- Marquita Payne admitted that it was part of the scheme to defraud CCC to conceal that Sharod Gordon would personally benefit from a payment on a contract awarded by CCC.
 - This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by Article 5.3.3(j)(9) of the Debarment Policy, in that she violated ethical standards established by the Board, or other dishonesty incident to obtaining and or performing any Board contract as a result of her relationship to Sharod Gordon, contrary to Article 5.2.10(1) of the CCC Ethics Policy.
 - This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by Article 5.3.3(i) of the Debarment Policy, in that she operated the CCC vendor, in a manner designed to evade the application or to defeat the purpose of this or any other Board Policy or any provision of any federal, state or local statute, ordinance, rule or regulation or any other applicable law, rule or regulation, specifically Article 5.2.10(1) of the CCC Ethics Policy.
 - This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by 5.3.3(j)(18) of the Debarment Policy, in that she assisted Sharod Gordon in violating Article 5.2.10(1) of the CCC Ethics Policy.
- Marquita Payne admitted that she and Sharod Gordon prepared, submitted, and caused to be prepared and submitted invoices to CCC in the name of the CCC vendor, when in truth, a portion of such payment was intended for Sharod Gordon.
- Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme to defraud that Sharod Gordon, Marquita Payne, and the CCC vendor did not perform all of the community canvassing and flyer distribution services for which invoices were submitted to CCC.
- Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that, after CCC made payments to the CCC vendor, Marquita Payne withdrew and caused to be withdrawn money from the bank account of the CCC vendor and paid kickbacks to Sharod Gordon.
- Marquita Payne admitted that it was part of the scheme that on or about June 5, 2015, Sharod Gordon and Marquita Payne prepared, submitted, and caused to be submitted, to CCC a vendor application on behalf of the CCC vendor so that Marquita Payne and the CCC vendor would be qualified as a vendor eligible to provide services to CCC.
- Marquita Payne admitted the following in relation to the June 2015 invoice:
 - Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that, on or about June 25, 2015, Sharod Gordon and Marquita Payne prepared, submitted, and caused to be submitted to CCC an

invoice representing that in exchange for \$20,000, Marquita Payne and the CCC vendor would canvass communities in Chicago in order to distribute 20,000 flyers promoting programs offered by CCC. On or about June 26, 2015, CCC paid the CCC vendor for such services.⁹ On or about July 11, 2015, Marquita Payne gave Sharod Gordon \$9,000 of that \$20,000. Subsequently, in or around August 2015, Marquita Payne and the CCC vendor performed only certain canvassing services for which it had been paid by CCC.

- This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by Article 5.3.3(j)(5) of the Debarment Policy, in that she engaged in bribery.
- Marquita Payne admitted the following in relation to the September 2015 invoice:
 - Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that, on or about September 25, 2015, Sharod Gordon and Marquita Payne submitted and caused to be submitted to CCC a second invoice on behalf of the CCC vendor. This second invoice represented that in exchange for \$5,000, Marquita Payne and the CCC vendor would canvass communities in Chicago in order to distribute 20,000 flyers promoting programs offered by CCC. At the time of the September 25, 2015 invoice, Marquita Payne knew that she and the CCC vendor had not performed all of the canvassing services set forth in the June 2015 invoice. In addition, at the time of the September 25, 2015 invoice, Marquita Payne did not disclose to CCC that Sharod Gordon had earlier received a kickback from the CCC vendor.
 - This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by Article 5.3.3(j)(2) of the Debarment Policy, in that she submitted an invoice containing false or frivolous claims.
 - Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that on or about October 6, 2015, Marquita Payne and Sharod Gordon knowingly caused to be transmitted in interstate commerce by means of wire communication certain writings, signs, and signals, namely data relating to the negotiation of a check, in the amount of approximately \$5,000 from an account at JP Morgan Chase to another account at JP Morgan Chase, which represented a payment by CCC for the invoice submitted in the name of the CCC vendor dated September 25, 2015, and which wire communication was routed across state lines.
 - CCC PeopleSoft Finance records reflect this payment to the CCC vendor / Marquita Payne.

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⁹ CCC PeopleSoft Finance records reflect this \$20,000 to the CCC vendor. Specifically, the aforementioned records reflect three payments on June 26, 2015 as follows: \$8,010.00, \$3,000, and \$8,990. The aforementioned payments total \$20,000.

- Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that after receiving the aforementioned \$5,000, Marquita Payne withdrew and caused to be withdrawn money from the bank account of the CCC vendor and paid a kickback to Sharod Gordon. In particular, on or about October 6, 2015, Marquita Payne withdrew \$2,500 from the bank account of the CCC vendor and gave that money, in the form of a cashier's check, to Sharod Gordon.
 - This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by Article 5.3.3(j)(5) of the Debarment Policy, in that she engaged in bribery.
- Marquita Payne admitted that neither Marquita Payne nor the CCC vendor performed any canvassing services for which it had been paid by CCC in relation to the September 25, 2015 invoice.
- Marquita Payne admitted the following in relation to the December 2015 invoice:
 - Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that, on or about December 10, 2015, Sharod Gordon and Marquita Payne submitted and caused to be submitted to CCC a third invoice on behalf of the CCC vendor. This third invoice represented that in exchange for \$10,000, Marquita Payne and the CCC vendor would canvass communities in Chicago in order to distribute 20,000 flyers promoting programs offered by CCC. At the time of this December 10, 2015 invoice, Marquita Payne knew that she and the CCC vendor had not performed all of the canvassing services set forth in the June 2015 invoice and had not performed any of the canvassing services set forth in the September 2015 invoice. In addition, at the time of the December 10, 2015 invoice, Marquita Payne did not disclose to CCC that on two earlier occasions Sharod Gordon had received kickbacks from the CCC vendor.
 - This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by Article 5.3.3(j)(2) of the Debarment Policy, in that she submitted an invoice containing false or frivolous claims.
 - Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that on or about December 11, 2015, Marquita Payne and Sharod Gordon knowingly caused to be transmitted in interstate commerce by means of wire communication certain writings, signs, and signals, namely, data relating to the negotiation of a check, in the amount of approximately \$10,000 from an account at JP Morgan Chase to another account at JP Morgan Chase, which represented a payment by CCC for the invoice submitted in the name of the CCC vendor dated December 10, 2015, and which wire communication was routed across state lines.

- CCC PeopleSoft Finance records reflect this payment to the CCC vendor / Marquita Payne.
- Marquita Payne admitted that it was further part of the scheme that after receiving the aforementioned \$10,000, Marquita Payne withdrew and caused to be withdrawn money from the bank account of the CCC vendor and paid a kickback to Sharod Gordon. In particular, on or about December 19, 2015, Marquita Payne withdrew \$5,000 from the bank account of the CCC vendor and gave that money, in the form of a cashier's check, to Sharod Gordon. Neither Marquita Payne nor the CCC vendor performed any canvassing services for which it had been paid by CCC in relation to the December 10, 2015 invoice.
 - This admission established that Marquita Payne engaged in conduct prohibited by Article 5.3.3(j)(5) of the Debarment Policy, in that she engaged in bribery.

Based on the admissions made by Marquita Payne, it is clear that Marquita Payne, as the principal and sole proprietor of the CCC vendor, engaged in various acts which serve as causes for debarment pursuant to the Debarment Policy. Moreover, since Marquita Payne's conduct occurred in connection with her performance of duties for or on behalf of the CCC vendor, her conduct should be imputed to the CCC vendor. Thus, the OIG recommended that the CCC initiates the process to permanently debar Marquita Payne and the CCC vendor from doing any future business with CCC pursuant to the CCC Debarment Policy of Article 5.3 *et seq.* of the Board Policies and Procedures for Management and Government.

Effective August 5, 2021, Marquita Payne and the vendor company were permanently debarred from doing any future business with CCC.¹⁰

Report Submitted Documenting Not Sustained Findings with Recommendations

OIG Case Number 21-0043

The OIG received a complaint alleging that a call center representative assigned to the District Office, who previously worked as a college senior storekeeper assigned to a City College, used the Federal Express ("FedEx") account of the employee's previously assigned City College for personal use. Based on this complaint, the OIG initiated an investigation.

The OIG investigation revealed that in August 2020 and October 2020, the employee, who previously worked as an employee in the Central Stores

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¹⁰ OIG Case Number 17-0179 remains an active investigation while the other defendants' criminal cases are pending.

Department of a City College, charged a total of three personal shipments not related to City Colleges of Chicago, totaling \$62.91 to the FedEx account of the City College and such costs were charged to and paid by that City College. However, the OIG investigation did not conclusively reveal that the employee intentionally charged those three personal shipments to the FedEx account of the City College. Because the OIG investigation did not conclusively reveal that the employee intentionally charged the three personal shipments to the FedEx account of the City College, the OIG did not find that the employee violated any CCC policy.

Based on the investigation, the OIG recommended the following:

- The OIG did not recommend any disciplinary action against the employee.
- As the employee personally benefitted from the City College paying for his three personal FedEx shipments, the OIG recommended that the employee reimburse the City College in the amount of \$62.91 for the cost of the employee's three personal FedEx shipments that were charged to and paid for by the City College.
- Considering that the employee was able to, albeit mistakenly, charge three shipments to the FedEx account of the City College more than three years after the employee no longer worked for the City College, the OIG recommended that the Office of Human Resources implement a process to ensure that upon termination of employment, each former employee's access to all City Colleges of Chicago accounts, including vendor accounts, is immediately deactivated.

The Chief Talent Officer for CCC provided the OIG with a response to the OIG Investigative Summary regarding this investigation. The response indicated, in pertinent part, the following:

I have discussed the matter with the Provost (copied on this response) and it was determined that he was following the OIG recommendation to not pursue any disciplinary action for [the employee].

Regarding the process related to systems signons that allowed [the employee] to utilize City Colleges FedEx Account long after [the employee's] change of position, I have determined the following:

 Human Resources does not track any systems access other than the HRIS/Payroll system. OIT only tracks major systems access such as (but not limited to) Peoplesoft, Anaplan, or Academics based system.
They do not have the means or the capabilities to track ancillary or position specific system sign-ons.

Based on this information, I have created the following new processes within Human Resources:

- Whenever an employee ends employment with City Colleges, the HRBP person responsible for that employee will remind the individual's manager that they need to review any systems access the individual may have to make sure that systems are shut off and can not be accessed after the employee's departure.
- Recruiting team will follow up with Manager when a request for posting replacement position is made to verify that they have shut off any ancillary or position specific system signons necessary.

Although ultimately it will continue to be the responsibility of each Manager to track their ancillary or position specific sign-ons, HR will do what they can to prompt the process.

Regarding the OIG recommendation that the employee reimburse the City College for the cost of the three personal FedEx shipments, the Office of Human Resources recently provided the OIG with an update on its efforts to obtain the reimbursement from the employee. Based on that update, those efforts are ongoing.

Annual Audit of the District's Compliance with the CCC Residency Policy

OIG Case Number 21-0087

Under the heading *Annual Certification of Residency*, Article 4.6(a) of the Board Policies and Procedures for Management & Government, which sets forth the CCC Residency Policy, provides that on February 1st of each year every full-time CCC employee will be required to certify their compliance with the residency policy. The employee's certification shall include an oath or affirmation that the employee is not required to be an actual resident because he/she falls within one of the exceptions to the requirement or that the employee is an actual resident of the City of Chicago. Additionally, Article 4.6(a) provides that "the Inspector General shall conduct an annual audit of the District's compliance with this Policy and shall submit a report of audit findings to the Board no later than the first regularly scheduled public meeting of the Board following July 1st of each year." On June 16, 2021, the OIG submitted the 2021 Audit of Compliance with the District's Residency Policy.

On February 1, 2021, full-time CCC employees were sent an email regarding the need to certify their Chicago residency for 2021 by completing the online *Annual Certification of Residency* form.

On May 7, 2021, the Office of Human Resources provided the OIG with the results of all of the responses received. The great majority (1,874) of the 1,912 (98%) full-time employees responded to the Annual Certification Process.

Of the 38 employees who did not respond, the OIG confirmed that 2 changed to terminated status, 14 were on leaves of absence, and 2 were on sabbatical leaves. Therefore, all but 20 of the full-time employees who were active and working during the 2021 certification of residency process responded. The table below documents the responses received District-Wide, as confirmed by the OIG.

Response	Number	%
No Response	20	1.05%
No Response due to employee being terminated	2	0.10%
No response due to employee being on a leave of absence	14	0.73%
No response due to employee being on sabbatical	2	0.10%
Required to be a resident, with correct address	1829	95.66%
2. Not required to be a resident, with correct address	5	0.26%
3. Required to be a resident, with incorrect address	8	0.42%
4. Not required to be a resident, with incorrect address	0	0.00%
5. Required to be a resident, but does not currently live within the City of Chicago	32	1.67%
Total	1912	100.00%

As part of the audit of compliance with the District's residency requirement, the OIG analyzed these full-time employee responses. The OIG analysis of these responses revealed the following:

- Regarding the 1837 employees who responded that they were required to be a resident of the City of Chicago (See Responses 1 and 3 in the table above):
 - As of June 15, 2021, the OIG had active investigations regarding 12 of these 1,837 full-time employees who represented that they were required to be a resident of the City of Chicago.
- Regarding the five employees who responded that they were not required to be a resident of the City of Chicago (See Responses 2 and 4 in the table above):
 - All five of those employees fell within an exception to the CCC residency requirement.
 - Two of these five employees were hired before July 1, 1977.

- Three of these five employees were exempt from the CCC residency requirement due to side letter agreements.
- Regarding the 32 employees who responded that they were required to be residents but did not currently reside within the City of Chicago (See Response 5 in the table above):
 - One of the 32 employees was exempt from the CCC residency requirement due to a side letter agreement.
 - Nine of the 32 employees were employed for less than six months or received approved extensions.
 - Twenty-two of the 32 employees responded that they did not currently reside within the City of Chicago, despite the fact that CCC records indicated a City of Chicago residential address for the employee.
 - The OIG reviewed CCC personnel records and public records regarding these 22 employees. This review revealed that 19 of those 22 employees appeared to reside in the City of Chicago, and they most likely checked the wrong box on the Annual Certification of Residency online form.
 - Prior to this audit, the OIG had an active residency investigation regarding one of these employees.
 - As a result of this audit, the OIG initiated investigations regarding two of these employees.
- Regarding the 20 employees who failed to respond but were active and working employees:
 - o One of these 20 employees was exempt from the residency requirement because the employee was hired before July 1, 1977.
 - CCC records indicated a City of Chicago residential address for the remaining 19 employees. The OIG reviewed public records regarding these 19 employees who did not respond. This review revealed that all 19 of the employees appeared to reside in the City of Chicago.
 - The OIG will follow-up with the Office of Human Resources regarding initiating disciplinary action for these employees who failed to respond.
- Prior to this audit, the OIG had an active residency investigation regarding one of the total 16 employees who did not respond but were on either a leave of absence or sabbatical.

As a result of OIG investigations completed during calendar year 2020 resulting in findings of violations of the CCC Residency Policy, five employees resigned or were terminated. Additionally, those five employees were designated as ineligible to be rehired.